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THE BACKGROUND TO T H E  LEGISLATION 
There has been a long-standing assumption that union membership will 
be required of most private sector workers in New Zealand. This assumption 
was sharply reversed in 1983, when the National Government of the day 
introduced voluntary unionism. In the following year the newly-elected 
Labour Government introduced legislation restoring compulsory unionism, 
the Industrial Relations Amendment Act 1985, which finally took effect 
on July 1 1985. These developments crystallised the arguments both for 
and against compulsory union membership and the debate was extended 
with the introduction of the draft Bill of Rights, which provided for freedom 
of associationl, and the discussion following the   re en Paper "Industrial 
Relations: A Framework for Reviewfi.2 The union membership debate raises 
issues of considerable complexity. At one end of the discussion, tension 
arises between the contrasting demands of individual and collective interests. 
At the other extreme, there is disagreement as to the practical effect either 
of the forms of union membership will have upon individual workers or 
upon the performance of industrial unions. Even where the protagonists 
in the debate find themselves in rare agreement as to the result of imposing 
either of the alternatives, for example the inevitable weakening of union 
power under a regime of voluntary unionism, differences remain as to  
whether that result is desirable. 
Like most issues turning on competing social interests, the questions 
of principle posed by the union membership debate are heavily laden with 
values. Those in favour of voluntary unionism tend to emphasise the personal 
freedom of the individual. Those who support compulsory unionism usually 
begin from the standpoint of the collective interests of organised labour 
and its relation with capital. Before considering the 1985 amendments in 
detail, we may briefly summarise the arguments on each side. 
Underlying the decision to introduce voluntary unionism in 1983 was 
the suggestion that: 
" ... a law to remove an individual's basic freedom of choice on whether to join, or not to 
join, an organisation must be supported by powerful argument and compelling reason . . ."3 
and that no such reasons existed: compulsory unionism was "a clear 
infringement of human freedom7'4 and "a clear form of discrimination in 
the workplace".5 It was argued that the implementation of voluntary 
I "A Bill of Rights for New Zealand", A.J.H.R. A6, 1985, 82. 
* Wellington, Government Printer, 1986. See also the Summary of Submissions, Wellington, 
Government Printer, 1986. 
3 The Hon. J.B.Bolger, "Reasons for Voluntary Unionism in 1983", in P.Brosnan (ed.) 
Voluntary Unionism, Industrial Relations Centre, V.U.W., 1983. 
4 Ibid., 24. A point made also by A.E.C.Hare, Industrial Relations in New Zealand, 
Wellington 1946, 31 8. 
The Hon. J.B.Bolger, speech notes, Address to the Auckland Chamber of Commerce, 17 
August 1983. 
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unionism would enable the New Zealand government to  ratify various 
u 
international conventions embodying the right to  freedom of association, 
notably I.L.O. Conventions 87 and 98.6 In the context of the draft Bill 
of Rights, it was alleged by the New Zealand Employers' Federation that 
any right to freedom of association should entail a corresponding "negative 
right" not to belong to a union.' 
The remaining arguments advanced in favour of voluntary unionism were 
more pragmatic. It was suggested that compulsory unionism had led to 
apathetic membership and to union officials who, being guaranteed that 
membership, took few steps to develop union services to members or to 
encourage participation in union activities.8 The allegation was made that 
compulsory membership enabled militant union officials to pursue industrial 
policies with which many of their members disagreed.9 Unions which enjoyed 
the benefit of compulsory union membership were also seen to be protected 
from the economic consequences of their actions.10 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the implementation of voluntary 
unionism took place in the context of proposals for a radical reorganisation 
of the New Zealand economy. Many of the changes proposed by the then 
National Government were opposed by the union movement, which was 
seen by the government as lacking "innovative thinking" on such issues 
as labour market flexibility.11 A weakening of union power as a consequence 
of voluntary unionism was seen as desirable in the interests of hastening 
change in areas such as technology and shift work.12 In summary, the 
increasing influence of neo-classical economists led to calls for a reduction 
in rigidities and institutional barriers in the labour market and a weakening 
of the relative bargaining power of organised labour.13 
The principal argument raised in favour of compulsory unionism was 
Ibid. Subsequently the Minister of Labour retreated from this argument, since ratification 
of Convention 87 would entail loss of the power to deregister unions. See generally 
G.A.Anderson and P.Brosnan "Freedom of Association: New Zealand Law and I.L.O. 
Convention 87" (1984) NZLJ 307 and G.A.Anderson, "International Labour Standards 
and the Review of Industrial Law" (1986) NZJIR 27. 
7 J.W.Rowe, "Implications of Voluntary Unionism: the Employers' Perspective", in Brosnan, 
op. cit., at 28. This represented a marked change in attitude by employers, who had 
vigorously opposed voluntary unionism in 1961 (see N.S.Woods, Industrial Conciliation 
and Arbitration in New Zealand, Wellington, 1963, at 195) and in 1975 (see the 
Federation's Annual Report, Employer, No.25, Nov.1975). In 1974 a research paper 
circulated by the Employers' Federation, "Preference of Employment for Members of 
Unions", argued that the ethical questions in the debate were "probably not the concern of 
employers". 
8 Bolger, op. cit., and Rowe, op. cit. See also Hare, op. cit., at 195 et seq. and 318-319, and 
Woods. OD. cit.. at 193. This view was advanced also by some union officials, as it had been 
, - 
when earlier debates on voluntary unionism had takeiplace: see Hare, idem. 
The Hon. J.B.Bolger, 1983 N.Z.Parl.Deb. 2459. The introduction of voluntary unionism 
took place against the background of a campaign of strikes against the wage freeze then in 
force. The government of the day alleged that the industrial action was contrary to the 
wishes of many of the participants. 
lo Industrial Relations: A Framework for Review - Summary of Submissions, 13. 
Bolger, op. cit. 
'2 Ibid. 
' 3  J. Boston, Incomes Policy in New Zealand, V.U.W., 1984, 268. Ironically, these changes 
were minor compared with the sweeping deregulation of the manufacturing, agricultural 
and financial sectors subsequently carried out by the incoming Labour Government which 
nevertheless favoured compulsory unionism, an apparent contradiction not lost on the 
proponents of voluntary unionism. 
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the need for an equilibrium of power in industrial relations.14 The right 
to collective freedom of association, it was argued, could only be exercised 
in the industrial arena through effectively-organised, financially-viable, 
unions with a strong membership.15 In particular, compulsory union 
membership was said to "provide protection for vulnerable groups from 
exploitation and victimisation (such as women workers and those in small 
or scattered workplaces)".l6 It was argued that the balance of power within 
the union movement was also affected: compulsory membership was seen 
as leading to a preponderance of "moderate" unions whose block vote at 
union conferences avoided undue industrial militancy. The system was also 
convenient for employers, since it provided one "bargaining unit" in the 
course of negotiations. Individual freedom of choice, stressed by the 
proponents of voluntary unionism, was said to be adequately catered for 
by the right to exemption on grounds of conscientious objection, the 
obligatory three-yearly ballots on the inclusion of the union membership 
clause, the right to attend union meetings and the long-standing right not 
to pay "political" levies." 
Further, it was argued that workers who left unions would significantly 
disadvantage those who remained, by weakening the union's bargaining 
power, and in the longer term this effect would spread as stronger unions 
opted for independent bargaining, thus weakening the national award system 
itself and undermining horizontal relativities.18 Whilst abandoning their 
union, workers who resigned would nevertheless continue to enjoy the 
benefits which the union had negotiated. This issue - that of "free riders" 
- underpinned much of the debate on voluntary unionism. Professor Young 
sums up the issue in these terms19 
"Collective bargaining determines the terms and conditions of the whole work force covered 
by the agreement. The union represents the workforce in negotiating the agreement. All who 
benefit from the negotiations ought to contribute to their cost. Refusing to make such financial 
contributions is regarded as "free-riding" at the expense of one's fellows. As such it is but 
one step removed from scabbing (strike breaking)." 
It can be seen that the issue of "free-riders" raises questions both of 
principle and of practicality. At the level of principle, it was seen as unfair 
to expect union members to bear the cost of obtaining improvements in 
wages and conditions that benefit all workers covered by awards, whether 
or not those workers were union members: that "those who gain should 
share in the cost of that gain".20 More pragmatically, it was recognised 
that "free-riders" constituted an emotive issue in industrial relations and 
l4 Human Rights Commission, Membership of Unions and the Right to Freedom of 
Association, March 1985, 8 .  
15 Ibid. 
l 6  Summary of Submissions, op. cit. The fears prompting this point of view were borne out 
by developments after the imposition of voluntary unionism: see R.Harbridge and 
P.Walsh, "Legislation Prohibiting the Closed Shop in New Zealand: Its Introduction and 
Consequences", unpublished paper, 1985. 
l 7  See M.Wilson,"Union Membership in New Zealand: An Assessment of Government 
Policy" (1976) NZJIR 9. 
18 See K.G.Douglas, "Implications of Voluntary Unionism: The Union Perspective" in 
Brosnan, op.cit. 
l 9  Union Membership, Industrial Relations Centre, V.U.W., 1976, 10. 
20 Summary of Submissions, op. cit. 
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a fruitful source of conflict in the workplace.2' Theoretically attractive 
solutions to the problem, such as the formation of societies by non-unionised 
workers to negotiate their own conditions, or the payment of a levy by 
such workers to  compensate unions for the cost of bargaining on their 
behalf, were seen to be inconsistent with the existing industrial framework.22 
Introducing the 1985 amending legislation to Parliament, the Minister 
of Labour described the new system as having five broad feature~:~3 
1. Legislation inserted a non-negotiable union membership clause into all 
awards and agreements for a period of 18 months from 1 July 1985. 
This clause required all workers covered by an award or collective 
agreement to become and remain union members as a condition of 
employment. 
2. Within eighteen months of the enactment of the legislation, ballots were 
to take place on the retention of the union membership clause, to test 
workers' opinion on the requirement to join a union. Subsequent ballots 
were to be required at 3-yearly intervals in order to retain or to restore 
the union membership clause. 
3. A procedure was introduced to  enable persons to be exempted from 
union membership on grounds of conscientious objection or other deeply 
held personal belief. 
4. A discrimination provision made it an offence for employers or unions 
to discriminate on the basis of union membership or non-membership 
of a union. Nor were benefits to be conferred on workers because of 
their membership or non-membership of a union. 
5. Statutory power of enforcement of the union membership clause was 
to be the responsibility of the union. 
We can now turn to the detailed provisions of the legislation. 
The reintroduction of preference as from July 1 1985 caused practical 
problems. With the introduction of voluntary unionism all existing 
unqualified preference clauses had been deemed to be of no effect as from 
February 1 1984.24 The Labour Government had undertaken to provide 
for internal ballots on union membership. Yet the implementation of those 
ballots, without more, would clearly delay further the effective 
commencement date of union membership clauses which (under the old 
system of unqualified preference) could have been negotiated into industrial 
instruments in the following September. Further, the Government was 
2 '  Again, a fear borne out by the aftermath of voluntary unionism. See the strike statistics 
presented in Harbridge and Walsh, op. cit. 
22 At this point the argument becomes circular, since the rigid structure of union recognition 
is opposed by most of the interest groups who favour voluntary unionism. See, for 
example, New Zealand Employers' Federation, The Industrial Relations Green Paper: An 
Employer Perspective, 1986, and the New Zealand Business Round Table, New Zealand 
Labour Market Reform, 1986. 
2 3  The H0n.S. Rodger, 1984 N.Z.Parl.Deb. 2791. 
24 Industrial Relations Amendment Act 1983, s.5, substituting the now-repealed s.100(2) of 
the Industrial Relations Act 1973. 
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committed to allowing a "breathing space" in which unions could repair 
some of the perceived damage done by voluntary unionism to their morale 
and internal organisation, before facing a compulsory ballot amongst their 
members.25 The legislative solutio'n was two-fold. Union membership clauses 
were deemed to be contained in industrial instruments registered under 
the 1973 Act for a period of 18 months beginning on July 1 1985. Thereafter 
the inclusion of such clauses depended upon an internal ballot.26 The 
transitional period has now expired, although argument still continues 
concerning the compatibility with freedom of association of a legislatively- 
imposed period of compulsory unionism.27 
BALLOTS ON THE UNION MEMBERSHIP CLAUSE 
Opponents of the repeal of voluntary unionism based many of their 
arguments on the allegedly undemocratic nature of compulsory union 
membership. In order to meet these arguments, the government included 
in the amending legislation provisions under which the obligation to belong 
to a union would depend upon regular ballots. Ballots had, of course, 
been a controversial feature of the previous government's industrial relations 
legislation, being fiercely opposed both by the trade unions and the then 
Labour opposition.28 Under s.99 of the Industrial Relations Act 1973 29 
mandatory rules relating to ballots on the union membership clause are 
deemed to be included in the rules of unions registered as at July 1 1985 
and must be included in the rules of unions which register after that date. 
The rules must not be amended by the union and they prevail over any 
other provision of the rules.30 Ballots under s.99 fall into two classes: 
"retention ballots", in respect of industrial instruments which currently 
include a union membership clause, and "restoration and initial ballots", 
in respect of industrial instruments which do not currently include such 
a clause. 
Due to the transitional provisions of the 1985 amending legislation, 
initially most unions were faced with the retention ballot. In practice such 
ballots must be conducted every three years. Under s.99, those eligible to 
vote in such a ballot are the "appropriate financial members of the union".31 
25 The introduction of voluntary unionism had taken place during a wage freeze. This, 
combined with the removal of a union's ability to negotiate preferential redundancy 
agreements for their members and the removal of union "monopoly" over personal 
grievances, was seen as destroying the most powerful material incentives to belong to a 
union by withdrawing from unions the ability to service their members in traditional areas. 
26 The transitional provision was contained in s.17 of the Industrial Relations Amendment 
Act 1985. 
27 The removal of voluntary unionism prompted a partially successful complaint by the New 
Zealand Employers Federation to the International Labour Organisation in June 1985. 
The Freedom of Association Committee of the ILO held that the manner in which 
compulsory union membership clauses were imposed during the period of 18 months from 
1 July 1985 was not in conformity with the principle that workers should be able to form 
and join organisations of their own choosing. The Committee did not consider the concept 
of industry-wide ballots for union membership clauses to be contrary to principles of 
freedom of association (Employer, August 1986). 
28 N.S.Woods, "Why Laws Like This?" (1977) NZLJ 352. 
29 Inserted by s.4 of the Industrial Relations Amendment Act 1985. 
30 Industrial Relations Act 1973, s.99(1). 
Section 98 defines such members as the financial members of the union who are bound by 
an award, collective agreement or determination by which members of the union are 
bound. 
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The committee of management of the union must ensure that steps are 
taken to publicise the pending ballot, to discuss it at a special meeting 
and to conduct the secret ballot amongst appropriate financial members.32 
The majority of recorded votes stands.33 The ballot must be conducted 
under the supervision of the Registrar of Industrial Unions or by a designated 
officer of the Department of Labour.34 
The retention ballot operates where a union membership clause is already 
contained in the relevant agreements. What if the agreements do  not contain 
such a clause but the union wishes to introduce one? Two examples will 
occur in practice, and both are covered by the mandatory union rules 
introduced by s.99. First, the union may not previously have been party 
to industrial instruments containing union membership clauses. Here s.99 
requires an initial ballot to be held. Secondly, the union may have been 
party to instruments containing a union membership clause but that clause 
may have been removed either as the result of an unfavourable ballot or 
because it has been allowed to "lapse": here the union will require the 
clause to  be re-inserted. In this case the union must conduct a restoration 
ballot under s.99. The rules relating to the conduct of initial ballots and 
restoration ballots are identical and differ significantly from those applying 
to retention ballots. In particular, those entitled to  vote at meetings called 
to discuss initial and restoration ballots include not only the financial 
members of the union but also those workers who are not union members 
but who will be bound to become union members if a union membership 
clause is inserted in the relevant industrial instruments. The committee of 
management must take all reasonably practicable steps (including newspaper 
advertising) to ensure that these non-members are made aware of the ballot 
and of the procedure by which they become eligible to vote and, further, 
that committee must ensure that non-members are given a reasonable time 
within which to comply with the technical prerequisites for voting.35 The 
1973 Act provides detailed complaint procedures in relation to irregularities 
in the conduct of ballots, which may give rise to an inquiry by the Registrar 
of Industrial Unions and, ultimately, a referral to  the Arbitration 
Certain standard provisions applying to the three species of ballot are 
inserted into union rules by s.99 of the 1973 Act. Of these, the most important 
is the restriction on the frequency of ballots: the union must not conduct 
a ballot under its rules if the Registrar of Industrial Unions has issued 
a certificate showing the result of an earlier ballot during the two years 
preceding the date on which the proposed ballot is to be conducted. This 
provision must be read together with s.100(1) of the 1973 Act which states 
32 For the purposes of this rule, the term "special meeting" includes any meeting of the 
appropriate financial members of the union residing or working in any particular locality, 
"being a meeting called expressly for the purpose of considering whether a union 
membership clause should be included in each of the awards and in each of the collective 
agreements by which members of the union are bound from time to time" (Industrial 
Relations Act 1973, s.99). 
32 The view of the majority is represented by the majority of the valid votes cast in the secret 
ballot, including special votes (ibid.). The ballot form is set out in Form 4 in Schedule 1B 
in the 1973 Act. 
34 For the Department's internal guidelines, see Department of Labour Circular No 908, 
1985, H.O. 46/3/66. For the form of notice to the Registrar, see Form 3 in Schedule 1B in 
the 1973 Act. 
35 In form 1 in Schedule 1B in the 1973 Act. 
36 See the Industrial Relations Act 1973, ss.102C - 102G. 
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that, where a ballot favours the insertion or retention of a union membership 
clause, the clause will continue to be inserted in each of the relevant industrial 
instruments for a period of three years.37 The remaining standard provisions 
are mechanical rules relating to returning officers and special votes. 
The ballots are supervised by the Registrar of Industrial Unions who 
must be given at least thirty days notice of the relevant special meetings3* 
and the 1973 Act sets out detailed procedural rules relating to the conduct 
of the ballot, and to offences and inquiries, which need not be elaborated 
here.39 Once a ballot on the union membership clause has been conducted 
under the 1973 Act, it relies for its implementation on a certificate from 
the Registrar of Industrial Unions. Under s.102B of the 1973 Act, such 
a certificate can only be issued once every three years on the basis of a 
majority vote of the relevant workers. The Arbitration Court must, where 
necessary, make the required consequential amendments to the award or 
agreement and ensure that the application of the clause is clearly set out 
in the relevant instrument.40 
THE SCOPE O F  THE UNION MEMBERSHIP CLAUSE 
Under s.98 of the Industrial Relations Act 1973, inserted by the 1985 
amending legislation,4* a union membership clause means a clause which 
provides that: 
"If any adult person (other than a person who holds a certificate of exemption from union 
membership issued under section 1120 of the Industrial Relations Act 1973) who is not a 
member of a union of workers bound by this award (or agreement) is engaged or employed 
by any employer bound by this award (or agreement), the person shall become a member 
of the union within 14 days after that person's engagement or, as the case may require, 
after this clause comes into force, and shall remain a member of the union so long as that 
person continues in the position or employment." 
In effect, the union membership clause is the unqualified preference clause 
under a different name. For the purposes of the clause "adult person" means 
a person of the age of eighteen years or upwards or a person of any age 
who is receiving not less than the minimum rate of wages or salary payable 
to an eighteen year old or to a person over that age.42 A union membership 
clause may be inserted in an industrial instrument only in accordance with 
the provisions of the 1973 Act,43 upon which it takes effect according to 
its tenor.44 Union members are not entitled to preference in obtaining or 
retaining employment by reason of their membership of a union, except 
for the preference conferred by a union membership clause 45 and, reinforcing 
37 Statistics have yet to be published on ballot results. For the results of earlier ballots, see 
J.M.Howells, "For or Against Compulsory Unionism: Recent Ballots in New Zealand" 
(1983) International. Lab. Rev. 95. 
38 Industrial Relations Act 1973, s.102. The appropriate form is Form 3 in Schedule 1B in the 
1973 Act. 
39 Ibid., s.102A. The form of the ballot paper is prescribed by Form 4 in Schedule 1B in the 
1973 Act. 
40 Industrial Relations Act 1973, s.lO1. For the certificate, see Form 5 in Schedule B in the 
1973 Act. Union amalgamations attract special rules under ss.lOlD and 101C. 
41 Industrial Relations Amendment Act 1985, s.4. 
42 Ibid., s.98. 
43 Ibid, s.98A(1). 
44 Ibid, s.98A(2). 
45 Ibid, s,98A(3). 
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this qualification, such preference is declared not to be an "industrial matter" 
and hence not able to be negotiated.46 No industrial instrument (including 
an agreement filed under s.141 of the 1973 Act47) may contain a provision 
requiring any worker to join a union other than a union membership clause 
inserted in accordance with the provisions of the 1973 A ~ t . ~ 8  
THE EFFECT OF THE UNION MEMBERSHIP CLAUSE 
Where a union membership clause is inserted in an award or collective 
agreement, a worker to  whom the union membership clause applies and 
who fails to become a member of the union after a request to do so from 
an authorised union representative is deemed to have committed a breach 
of award: failure to  remain a member is likewise treated as a breach.49 
Employers bound by the award or agreement are deemed to commit a 
breach if they continue to employ any such worker.50 The duty of seeing 
that the membership clause is complied with rests with the relevant union: 
neither the Department of Labour nor any Inspector of Awards is charged 
with the duty of enforcing observance of the union membership clause 
or any award provision requiring employers to supply employee lists.51 
Under the system of unqualified preference, workers who had a 
conscientious objection to union membership could apply for an exemption 
from the obligation to belong to a union. This right became redundant 
upon the introduction of voluntary unionism and it was repealed with the 
amending legislation of 1983. With the return of preference the right of 
conscientious objection was restored although the grounds of objection 
were broadened. Under s.112C of the 1973 Act, an application for exemption 
may ;be made on the grounds that: 
"the applicant genuinely objects, on the grounds of conscience or other deeply held personal 
conviction, to becoming or remaining a member of any union whatsoever or of a particular 
union."* 
Ironically, given the criticism directed at the "compulsory" aspects of 
the 1985 legislation, this definition was drawn from British legislation 
designed to curb the power of the closed shop in British industry by enabling 
more workers to opt out of that system.53 
A three-person tribunal known as the Union Membership Exemption 
Tribunal administers the system for union exemptions.54 That tribunal, 
which is deemed to be a Commission of Inquiry,55 consists of members 
recommended by the Minister of Labour having regard to their knowledge 
46 Ibid, s.2 (definition of "industrial matter''). 
47 Ibid, ~.98A(5). 
48 Ibid, ~.98A(4). 
49 Ibid, s.103(1). 
50 Ibid. 
5' Ibid, s. 103(2). 
52 Ibid, s. 112C. 
53 The Employment Act 1980 (U.K.), s.58(4). 
54 Industrial Relations Act 1973, s.107. 
55 Ibid., s.105(2). 
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and experience in human rights, religious beliefs and industrial relations.56 
The application procedure and the procedure and membership of the tribunal 
are fully set out in a number of mechanical sections and need not be 
elaborated.57 
The key legal question regarding exemption from union membership is 
the scope to be given to the stated grounds for exemption. What are "grounds 
of conscience" or "deeply held personal conviction" and how do such grounds 
differ from other states of mind? The Tribunal's decisions to date provide 
some guidelines. According to the Tribunal, the word "conscience" seems 
to imply: 
"...a judgment between right and wrong, a moral stance, whether or not influenced by religious 
beliefs. The word 'conviction' implies a judgment which is not necessarily based on convictions 
of morality, but such considerations are not required to be excluded. On the other hand, 
a 'conviction' is not limited to a state of mind arrived at by a rational process, and still 
less a state of mind which is to be found reasonable on an objective basis.'3g 
It follows that the Tribunal is not concerned with the validity of the 
applicant's beliefs and that the steps taken by the applicant to verify his 
or her beliefs will usually be irrelevant. The reasons for that belief have 
been treated as relevant "only so far as they have probative value in 
establishing the existence of the grounds of conscience on which she relies, 
and in showing that this is the true basis of her objection to union 
rnernbership".59 
An objection to compulsion in itself, or to being bound by an award, 
falls outside the grounds set out in s.112C. The objection must be to 
membership of any trade union or of a particular trade union.60 In order 
to satisfy the Tribunal that he or she is objecting to union membership, 
the applicant must show that membership would place "some burden" on 
him or her, or operate in some way to his or her detriment involving suffering 
"in some special wayV.61 Thus applications have failed where the ground 
of objection is the belief that there is no need for union membership G2 
or where the objection is simply to an obligation falling on all members, 
such as the duty to pay union fees.63 As a corollary, objections to union 
membership are not called into question simply because the applicant, if 
exempted, would continue to benefit from union activities such as the 
renegotiation of awards.64 
Objections have been upheld where they related, inter alia, to the political 
affiliation of a particular trade union, or of trade unions in general 65; 
where the applicant objected to strike action as an industrial tactic 66; where 
"professional standards of conduct" were seen as incompatible with union 
56 Ibid., s. 107(2). 
5' Ibid., ss.108-112A. 
58 LCIwson, unreported, 9 December 1985, UMET 4/85. 
59 Bruce, unreported, 9 December 1985, UMET 2/85. Cf. Brockie, unreported, 1 May 1986, 
UMET 38/86, and Te Groen, unreported, 23 December 1985, UMET 42/85. 
60 Summers, unreported, 9 December 1985, UMET 1/85. This decision sets out at length the 
Tribunal's general approach to such applications. 
61 Saunders, unreported, 7 April 1986, UMET 10186. 
62 Crosbie, unreported, 1 May 1986, UMET 39/86. 
63 Saunders, n.61 above. 
64 Long, unreported, 7 April 1986, UMET 9/86. 
65 Spiers, unreported, 7 April 1986, UMET 4/86 
66 Rulkens, unreported, 23 December 1985, UMET 45/86. 
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membership67; where union membership would conflict with the applicant's 
religious beliefs"; where the objection was to the "wrongness of union 
attitudes" towards collective bargaining69; where the applicant objected to 
"abuse of power" by union delegates70; and where the ground of objection 
was a conviction that the union was not looking after the applicant's 
interests." It is no answer to  such applications that union rules provide 
alternative mechanisms for settling grievances against the relevant union.72 
COMPULSORY UNIONISM AND T H E  BILL O F  RIGHTS 
Clause 14 of the proposed New Zealand Bill of Rights states that: 
"1. Everyone has the right to  freedom of association. 
2. This right includes the right of every person to form and join trade unions for the 
protection of that person's interests consistently with legislative measures enacted to  
ensure effective trade union representation and to encourage orderly industrial relations." 
The clause has proved to be controversial, largely because it omits any 
reference to a "right" not to  belong to a trade union. The argument in 
the White Paper that "the so-called 'negative freedom' - the freedom not 
to join a union - is not necessarily implied in the guarantee of the freedom 
to form and join trade unions" has frequently pre-occupied courts in Europe 
where similar problems arise in reconciling the "closed shop" with freedom 
of association under the European Convention on Human Rights and under 
national constitutions.73 The competing viewpoints are well-demonstrated 
in Young, James and Webster v United Kingdom, a case challenging the 
British "closed shop" under the European C ~ n v e n t i o n . ~ ~  In that case, an 
analysis of the majority opinion of the European Commission clearly 
discloses an underlying assumption that a right to associate necessarily 
has as its logical corollary a right not to associate.75 Against this, three 
dissenting judges held that the positive and negative aspects of freedom 
of association were quite separate and Judge Evriginis took the view that 
trade union freedom cannot be regarded as "no more than a general and 
individualistic concept of freedom of association", but is to a large extent 
determined by its character as a collective right, and that this collective 
right must be balanced against individual interests.76 Although the purely 
scmantic issue presented by any "negative right" in New Zealand will rest 
on the same considerations, in considering the wider issues we must not 
overlook the considerable differences between the union membership system 
67 Thomas-Lewis, unreported, 7 April 1986, UMET 8/86. 
" Bruce, unreported, 9 December 1985, UMET 2/85. 
69 Robinson,, unreported, 9 December 1985, UMET 5/85. 
'"bid. 
" Allerhv, unreported, 23 December 1985, U M E T  44/85, citing Horrte De1ivrr.v Service Ltd. 
v Shackclofh [I9851 ICR 147. 
72 Hatcher, unreported, 7 April 1986, UMET 15/86. 
73 There is an immense literature available. See generally F. von Prndzynski "Freedom of 
Association and the Closed Shop: The European Perspective" (1982) 41 CLJ 236. 
74 [I9811 I.R.L.R. 480. See von Prondzynski, ibid. Also Duffy (1980) Human Rights Review 
205 and (ed.) 1981 Human Rights Review 133; O'Higgins (1981) Human Rights Review 22; 
Drzemczewski and Wooldridge (1982) I.C.L.Q. 396; Shea (1982) 15 Cornell International 
Law Journal and C. Hanson et al., The Closed Shop, London 1982. 
75 Von Prondzynski, op. cit. 
76 Op. cit., n.2. 
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in New Zealand and the "closed shop" in Europe. In particular, the existence 
in New Zealand of a broad right of "conscientious objection", the provision 
for three-yearly ballots and the right to "opt out" of political levies. It 
might also be noted that continental trade unions are often ideologically 
pluralistic so that the issue raised when, say, a Catholic is forced to join 
a Communist trade union, becomes an issue of freedom of conscience as 
well as freedom of association.77 Such marked differences cast considerable 
doubt on the direct applicability of European case-law, notwithstanding 
the similarity in drafting of the relevant clauses.78 
It can be seen, then, that in construing the "freedom of association" 
clause in the proposed New Zealand Bill of Rights the courts will have 
to address a number of thorny questions. These include whether a correlative 
right not to associate stems from the positive right of free association, 
what corresponding right (if any) might exist in union members to refuse 
to associate with non-members, whether a person can be said to "waive" 
any right not to associate by taking a job knowing of union coverage (or, 
alternatively, whether the essential claim in this situation is effectively to 
a "right to work" not covered by the Bill of Rights), and the broader issues 
presented by the reference to "effective trade union representation" and 
the encouragement of orderly industrial relations. Clause 3 of the proposed 
Bill states that the rights and freedoms in the Bill may be subject only 
to such reasonable limits as can be demonstrably justified in a free and 
democratic society, and the question may ultimately arise whether 
compulsory unionism may be so justified.79 
Question 6 of the Green Paper80 asked for submissions on the most 
appropriate approach for determining compulsory union membership. The 
Summary of Submissions81 revealed a deep division between those who 
wished for the removal of compulsory unionism (predominantly employers) 
and those who wished that system to be maintained (predominantly unions). 
Several suggestions were made by those in the latter group for mechanical 
changes to the ballot procedures. Some employers favoured the approach 
under unqualified preference, whereby the question of union membership 
was a negotiable matter. The Government's Policy Statement on Industrial 
Relations82 indicates that this last approach will be restored in the anticipated 
Labour Relations Act, which will supersede the Industrial Relations Act 
1973. Whether union membership is compulsory or voluntary will be, in 
the first instance, a negotiable matter. If the parties to an award or agreement 
cannot agree, then a secret ballot of union members will follow on a similar 
basis to  the present arrangements, except that it will be award-based and 
not union-based. The insertion of a union membership clause will then 
depend on a simple majority of votes cast and the existing exemption 
7' See Lord Wedderburn in Duffy (ed.), n.2. 
'8 See A. Frame, "Freedom of Association and New Zealand Industrial Law" (1985) 15 
VUWLR 64. 
' 9  See generally P. Risworth, "Reasonable Limits on Fundamental Freedoms", (1986) AULR 
340. 
80 Note 2 above. 
81 Ibid. 
82 Wellington, Government Printer, September 1986. 
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procedures will continue. The results of the ballot will have an effective 
life of three documents. 
'The proposals in the Government's policy statement herald a return to 
unqualified preference in all but name. Yet it would be unwise to assume 
that the results of conciliation once union membership becomes negotiable 
will reflect the usual outcome during the period when there was a broad 
measure of consensus between employers and unions on union membership 
policy. Industrial relations commentators point to a new mood of militancy 
on the part of employers, fuelled by the "free market" thinking which 
pervades the New Zealand economy under the present government. 
Provision for compulsory unionism, once a foregone conclusion, may now 
become a powerful bargaining counter in the negotiation of some awards. 
